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Meituan · 3690 · HKEX

Meituan runs China's largest local-services platform — food delivery, in-store dining, hotels and travel, and on-demand grocery — earning its profit almost entirely from commissions and merchant advertising in its Core Local Commerce segment.

$9.13
Share price
$56B
Market cap
$50.0B
Revenue 2025
800M+
Consumers on platform
Listed at $8.8 in 2018, Meituan opened 2026 near $13.4, fell to an $8.2 low in June as the subsidy war hit profits, and closed at $9.13 on 3 July 2026 — a round-trip to its IPO price after a more-than-fivefold rise in revenue. This report is a guided study, built chapter by chapter for this company.
2 · The 2025 profit swing

Meituan's core profit engine swung from a record profit to a loss in a single year

20.9% → −2.6%
Core op. margin 2024 → 2025
−$8.1B
Swing in core operating profit
+60.9%
Selling & marketing spend, 2025
$9.7B
Swing in operating cash flow

A 20.9% operating margin in Meituan's core profit engine fell to negative 2.6% in a single year while segment revenue still grew, because rivals' subsidies forced a 60.9% jump in selling and marketing spend. The loss is already trailing off: the quarterly Core Local Commerce loss narrowed from $1.9B in the third quarter of 2025 to $0.3B by the first quarter of 2026 after an August 2025 truce. Restoring the pre-war margin and the $5.5–7.8B of annual operating cash it once produced is the bull case, not the recovery the price already assumes.

3 · Valuation

The valuation resolves to a margin Meituan stopped publishing in 2022

~5.2x
Operating EV / 2024 core op. profit
$7–20
Bear-to-bull value per share
~$7
Value swing per 5pp of normalised margin
~$3
Net cash + investments per share (fixed)

The ~$13-per-share gap between Meituan's bear and bull valuations turns almost entirely on the normalised Core Local Commerce margin — a figure dominated by an in-store, hotel and travel business that earned a 43.3% operating margin and ~70% of the two consumer segments' operating profit in 2021 but whose margin Meituan has not disclosed since April 2022. The counterweight is volume: in-store order volume rose more than 65% in 2024, and management describes its position in core in-store categories as stable — a blended-away margin is not evidence of erosion.

4 · The moat

The subsidy war tested the moat, and Meituan's per-order cost lead widened

  • A cost moat, not a share moat. Three sides feed one delivery network — 800M+ consumers, 10M+ merchants and 16M+ injury-insured couriers — and the density lowers cost-to-serve. Well-capitalised rivals can contest the profit pool, but through the war management says its unit-economics lead 'further widened'.
  • The order barely makes money by design. On a roughly $6.7 order Meituan targets about $0.14 of profit, near 3% — so the delivery leg runs at a loss and segment profit comes from commission and advertising. A 3% margin flips negative fast once rivals subsidise.
  • Transferability is still partly asserted. Keeta reached positive unit economics in Hong Kong by the fourth quarter of 2025, evidence the model travels; but Meituan quantifies its efficiency lead in words, not disclosed figures, and enriched courier-welfare costs lift the per-order breakeven permanently.
The read: the evidence points to Meituan as the probable survivor of a war it did not start — the moat is in cost-to-serve, not in a market share rivals cannot buy at.
5 · Capital allocation

The balance sheet can fund the fight; buybacks are what is left after it

  • Net cash, correctly sized. The $22.9B liquidity headline is about $11.9B net of $11.0B of debt — enough to absorb several years of subsidy losses — but gearing rose from ~32% to ~53% as $5.8B of debt was raised in 2025.
  • Returns are a residual. Operating cash flow swung from +$7.8B to −$1.9B; buybacks fell from $3.6B to $0.1B, and Meituan has never paid a dividend. Repurchases resume only after the business and its redeployment are funded.
  • The New Initiatives loss is chosen, not forced. Grocery and overseas Keeta lost $1.4B in 2025 — a discretionary redeployment of core cash with an off-switch, unlike the war-driven core loss. Cash is also going to the US$717M Dingdong grocery deal and $1.8B of AI capital spending.
Quality note: the headline $3.2B net loss is smaller than the $3.4B operating loss — about $0.8B of non-cash investment and FX gains flatter the operating damage.
6 · What to watch

The profit pool's normalised level is co-determined by policy, and the regulator has moved both ways in five years

  • The state can defend the pool. The 2025 war de-escalated when regulators moved against 'irrational' subsidies; the core quarterly loss narrowed from $1.9B to $0.3B as the truce took hold.
  • And it can compress it. The same regulator fined Meituan $0.54B in 2021 for abusing its dominance, and a nationwide courier social-security mandate adds a permanent, still-undisclosed cost to every order.
  • The balance of evidence. Meituan looks like the probable survivor, priced for a partial recovery — but the normalised margin that decides the value is one the company no longer prints, and the ceiling on returns is set in Beijing as much as in the market.
Strongest objection: The durability of Meituan's Core Local Commerce profit pool is set less by any moat or by rivals contesting it 'whenever they choose' than by Chinese regulatory policy — the 2025 war ended when the state curbed subsidies (the CLC quarterly loss narrowing from $1.9bn to $0.3bn as it did), and the same regulator's $0.54bn 2021 fine shows that discretion can compress the pool just as easily as defend it. The bulls' reply: Even if the state sets the ceiling, within it Meituan's cost moat decides who earns the normalised profit — the Q3→Q4 2025 turn began before the January-2026 State Council probe, management says its unit-economics lead 'further widened amid intensified competition', and the current anti-involution posture is defending, not compressing, the pool.

Watchlist to re-rate: Whether the Core Local Commerce quarterly loss keeps narrowing past the $0.3B of Q1 2026; any return to standalone in-store margin disclosure, or a buyback resumption on positive operating cash flow; and the regulator's next move — a binding subsidy cap versus renewed antitrust or higher labour-cost mandates.